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INDEPENDENT CALLING OF LIFE INSURANCE
SOLICITOR UNDER STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACTS
By REYNOLDS C. SEITz*
To date the life insurance companies have been generally
fortunate in not having been required to make contributions
for the purpose of protecting their commission paid solicitors'
within the scope of Unemployment Compensation Plans. Perhaps the insurance firms have been aided by the influence of the
ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the effect
that agents of insurance companies authorized to solicit applications for life insurance policies or annuity contracts are not
employees within the Social Security Act.2 At any rate, the
almost universal fact today is that insurance agents paid solely
by commission are not looked upon as coming within the coverage of the State Unemployment Compensation Acts.3 In twentytwo states4 there have been specific rulings by the administrative
* Asst. Professor of Law, The Creighton University; B. A. 1929,
M. A. 1932, LL. B. 1935, Creighton Univ. Admitted to practice in
Nebraska, 1935. Instructor in law, Univ. of Omaha Law School,
1935-36; instructor, Creighton Univ. since 1938.

2This discussion deals only with life insurance solicitors of the
non-industrial type. It does not deal with general or state agents or
state managers of life insurance companies.
3 See Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183,
4 Atl. (2) 640 (1939).
'The stated rule in many of the jurisdictions to the effect that the
insurance solicitor does come within the Act unless the company can
prove he is an independent contractor should not be accorded too much
weight. In actual practice the companies in most instances conduct
business without assuming the burden of proving their independent
contractors. They rely upon the fact that the administrative official
will not molest them. In those instances where the administrative
officers demand proof the company is usually able to establish that
commission salesmen are independent contractors.
4 Favorable rulings have been accorded one or more companies in
Ariz., Ark., Calif., Del., Fla., Ida., Iowa, Kans., Me., Mont., Nev., N. H.,
N. M., N. D., Ore., Pa., Tex., Utah, Ver., W. Va., Wisc. and Wyo. There
are some states that specifically exempt the commission paid insurance
salesmen by the wording of their statutes. Ala., Colo., Ind., Ky., La.,
Mass., Mich., Nebr., Ohio, S. D., and Va. are in the group. But even
though such exemptions exist, the companies organized in such states
are interested in the situation in other jurisdictions where they may
be licensed to do business. They may also be vitally interested because
of the retaliatory tax law. See on the latter point the author's article
on "RetaliatoryInsurance Tax Laws", 18 Neb. L. B. 150 (1939).
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officials in favor of one or more companies. In the various
instances litigation has not entered the picture to disturb the
administrative status quo.
It is this latter situation and the effect of the decision in
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone 5 that the various
states were not bound to interpret their Acts in accordance with
the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that has
prompted the author to write this article which has as its fundamental purpose the setting forth of a rationale upon which it
can logically be established that the life insurance solicitor is not
covered by the Acts. It is felt that the discussion will be of more
than academic or theoretical value. Up to the present the insurance companies have been active and instrumental in securing
rulings in their favor. They have presented the arguments and
brought the pressure. As a result of such procedure it is not
surprising that the rulings should be in behalf of the companies,
and it is not unreasonable to think that unemployment commissioners, would wish to remain passive and thereby create
immunity for the insurance firms. A look into the future, however, leads one to wonder if it is too far fetched to suspect that
some day agent's organizations will bring pressure. In the face
of a real contest the commissioners and later the courts may
not be as uniform6 in their attitude as seems to be the case at
present. If such an eventuality happens the commissioner and
judicial tribunals will have to decide the matter on the basis
7
of logic and helpful rules of law.
Acknowledging the supposition, it is submitted that the
battle must be fought out on the "independent calling" provisions of the Acts. The remainder of this article, therefore, will
be devoted to a discussion of the foundation problems involved.
One of the reasons that the state courts are not bound by the
Federal holding can be found in the difference in the wording
between the Federal and State statutes. The Social Security
Act defined the word employment as "any service of whatever
SuSpra, note 2.

6 See infra, note 18 for cases where solicitors were held to not be

independent contractors.
'That there is a real problem involved was brought out as early as
1937 by Professor Buscheck in his article, "If!e Insurance SolicitorEmployee or Independent Contractor," 25 Georgia L. J. 894 (1937). It
would seem that there the misconception in thinking arises out of the
failure to admit that an agent can be an independent contractor.
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nature performed within the United States by an employee for
9
his employer. "8 Under the vast majority of the State Acts the
-word employment is defined as follows:
"Services performed by an individual for remuneration shall be
deemed to be employment subject to this act unless and until it is
shown to the satisfacaion of the director that:
"(A) Such individual has been and will continue to be free from
control or direction over the performance of such service, both
under his contract of service and in fact; and
"(B) Such service is either outside the usual course of the business for which such service Is performed, or that such service is
performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprises
for which such service is performed; and
"(C) Such individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business, of the same
nature as that Involved in the contract of service."

Before launching directly into the analysis of the problem
10
it seems necessary to bring out the fact that the courts have
declared that a prerequisite to exemption from the coverage under
the unemployment compensation laws' consists in showing a
conformity with all of the "unless" clauses just previously
quoted. To show that an individual is exempt under one or two of
the clauses is of no avail.
Consequently, if the life insurance solicitor is not covered
by the type of Unemployment Compensation Act under inspection, 12 it will be because he can work out a factual picture of
exemption.
In attempting to work out such picture it is reasonable to
begin with the easiest task. Such task seems to be the demonstration that life insurance solicitors are exempt under clause (B)
of the Act. The fact that the insurance agent performs his
service outside of the places of business of the enterprises for
6See 26 U. S. C. A., section 1607(c) and historical note to such
section (1940).
'The following states define "employment" in a different manner:
Conn., Ida., Iowa, Kans., Ky., Minn., Miss., N. Y., Ore. and Tex.
Although some of the discussion in this article may not directly apply
to problems within the named states, it is of great importance to companies organized within the states for reasons mentioned in note 4,

ipra.

" Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88
P. (2) 560 (1939); Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
91 P. (2) 512 (Utah, 1939); Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst,
199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2) 718 (1939).

Of the type we are analysing.
"Throughout the remainder of the article the term Act will be
used to signify the type of statute quoted
u
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which such service is performed seems a logical deduction. It is,
of course, true that the solicitor frequently comes into the home
office or agency office of the insurance company. He may confer
with his superiors on business matters, he may attend classes of
instruction, he may pick up rate books, and he may even make
telephone calls to line up appointments with prospects. But
essentially, under a construction of language which is not unreal,
he is performing his service outside of the place of business of
his employer. His fundamental work must be performed outside the premises of the home or agency office. In deciding a
similar problem in connection with the coverage of carriers for
a newspaper the Washington Court remarked :1
'We cannot agree with the contention of the Attorney
one who would otherwise be an independent contractor
employee under the Unemployment Compensation Act if
any (italics mine) business related to the work at the

General that
becomes an
he transacts
office of the

employer. . . . It would be a strained construction to hold that
transactions merely incidental to the main purpose . . . carried on

at the office of the respondent company would bring the (individual)
within the provision of the statute."

Such a view is realistic and not new. For as the Washington
court 14 further points out, "One of the several common law tests
or elements considered in the determination of the relationship
between parties is the place where the work is done. If the work
is done upon the premises of the employer the inference is strong
that the workmen are employees and not independent contractors. "15
The next step in working out non-coverage under the Act
will lead to a scrutiny of clause (A). Even the first glance at
such section will reveal that we are involved in the tangle of
"control" philosophy so common to the independent contractor
cases. To substantiate that this is an elusive field it is necessary to quote only two authorities from among the hundreds
who have written on the subject. Professor Steffen has
remarked' 6 that the "theoretical basis for vicarious responsibility
is based upon a curious complex of truths, half truths and mystic
13Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2)
718, 727 (1939).
"IId. at 718.
15As substantiating the point see 1 Restatement of The Law of
Agency, section 220 (1933).
mO
"The INdependent Contractor and The Good Life," 2 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 501 (1935).

LiFE INSURANCE SOLICITOR

intuitions." Professor Buseheck has drawn our attention 17 to
the truth that "a veritable judicial Solomon could not formulate
any general principle or principles which would reconcile all
statements as to the status of salesmen because so often based
on the vague and nebulous conception of what constitutes a
servant, an agent, and an independent contractor."
In the face of such complexity it is not surprising to find
that, where opposition has been furnished to offset the pressure
of the insurance companies, the courts working behind the facade
of concepts have come out with decisions that find that insurance
companies do have control over their agents. Three recent
cases 1 8 have so held. Control has been based upon the following
evidenciary background: (1) Agents contracts can be terminated
at the will of the companies, (2) Agents are furnished with rate
books, advertising matter, and letter paper and must use such
material unless they get permission to use their own, (3) Agents
are confined by restrictions on the application blanks and by
other rules and regulations, (4) Agents must give exclusive
service, (5) Agents' records and reports belong to the company,
and (6) Agents do more than a specific piece of work.
Of course, in the three cases just previously mentioned, the
courts make an attempt to remove their work from the haze
surrounding the independent contractor doctrine. They contend that the intent of the legislatures in writing the Unemployment Insurance Acts was to include within the Acts many who
would be independent contractors at common law. They, therefore, feel convinced that there was enough control exercised to
bring the life insurance solicitor within the Acts. At later paragraphs in this article the author will take up the question of the
extended coverage, because of the claimed intent of the legislature. At this place he will content himself by attempting rebuttal
of the argument that there was enough control, even under com"I"Life Insurance Solicitor-Employee or Independent Contractor,"
25 Georgia L. J. 894 (1937).
'sEquitable
Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Comm., 95 P. (2) 4
(Colo. 1939); Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
103 Colo. 550, 88 P. (2) 560 (1939); Unemployment Compensation
Comm. of N. C. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N. C. 479, 2
S. E. (2) 584 (1939). Since the decisions in the Colorado cases the
statute has been changed to specifically exempt insurance solicitors
working solely on commission. Test suits are pending in Mo., N. Y.,
N. J. and Okla. In Ga., Ill., Maryland, and Minn. and R. I. the status
of Insurance solicitors are doubtful.

K. L. J.-4
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mon law principles, to warrant the conclusion that life insurance
agents come within the preview of unemployment compensation
plans. For such is the conclusion of the Colorado court in
Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. IndustrialCommission."
It is submitted that such reasoning leans heavily upon the theory
suggested by Professor Paul Leidy in the Michigan Law
Review. 20 It was there brilliantly argued that the control test
seemed to fit itself too readily into an ex post facto determination of a relationship. It was demonstrated that from very
meagre facts-and facts the same or similar-two courts declared
the relationship and then asserted that the defendant "had control" or "did not have control." As Professor Leidy put it,
"In view of the fact that, relationship once determined, control
would follow, as an implication of law, the possibility of reasoning
in a vicious circle is apparent." It was such a pikture that
caused Leidy to suggest that in salesmanship cases it would be
desirable to use, at least in conjunction with the control test,
another requirement, that is, one of "independent calling." As
support for such test, Milligan v. Wedge 2' is cited, in which case
the court held the defendant, a butcher, not liable for the negligence of the employee of a licensed drover. The court said:
"The party sued has not done the act complained of, but has
employed another who is recognized by the law as exercising a
distinct calling. The butcher was not bound to drive the beast
to the slaughter-house himself-he might not know how to drive
it.. . . He employs a drover, who employs a servant, who does
the mischief. The drover, therefore, is liable and not the owner
of the beast. . . The mischief was done in the course-not of the
butcher's business, but of the drover's." The rest of the article
is devoted to the thesis that salesmen who are driving cars as
they journey about to stimulate the sale of an employer's
products, salesmen-demonstrators who are driving automobiles
in attempts to interest prospective purchasers, their employers
being automobile agents, and salesmen-demonstrators who are
engaged in the demonstration, for purposes of sale, of secondhand cars belonging to individual owners are not engaged in
" Supra, note 18. In mentioning that control existed even under
common law standards the court by its approval incorporates Industrial

Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra, note 18, which involves a similar set of facts.
"Salesmen as Independent Contractors,"28 Mich. L. R. 365 (1930).
12 Adol. and El. 737, 113 Eng. Reprint 993 (1840).
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independent callings. For as the writer in the Michigan Law
Review 22 remarks, "They are just as clearly in the employ of
and in the pursuit of the business of the employer as were the
23
apprentice and driver for the drover in our hypothetical case.
Reflection upon such reasoning induces the feeling that tribunals
were attracted to such logic because of the prominence given
"independent calling" within "unless clause" (0) of the
Unemployment Act. The mistake, however, in the unemployment compensation cases seems to be that they have unduly
stretched Professor Leidy's theories of the positions of the salesmen at common law. His arguments pertained exclusively to
the kind of salesman who was directly or indirectly required to
use an automobile in the course of serving the employer. Consequently, even though Leidy found control because there was
no independent calling, his task was made easier because in a
number of the situations he alluded to the employer supplied the
instrumentality-the automobile. And at common law and
under the modern doctrine of the Restatement 24 one of the tests
for determining and independent contractor was whether the
employer or the workman supplied the instrumentalities for the
person doing the work. That such was actually the thought can
be gleaned from Leidy's language, "At a time when courts and
legislatures alike seem to be striving to find ways and means to
find car owners liable, it would seem unusual to find results
obviously counter to the prevailing trend."'2 5 In the remaining instances it seems that Leidy was imbued with the feeling
that the salesman was forced either directly or indirectly
(through a job or competition requirement) to use an automobile.
that the negligent driving of such automobile would often occur
and could not be fully guarded against, that automobiles carelessly driven caused serious damage, and that under such circumstances it seemed most fair to impose liability on the party
with the deepest pocket. 26 That such was the attitude seems a
justifiable inference from the following language: "In the
modern cases, involving automobile accidents, the automobile
itself injects a new element; one which makes the control test
"Salesmen as Independent Contractors," 28 Mich. L. R. 365
(1930).

Supra, note 21.
1 Restatement of Agency, section 220 (1933).
Supra, note 20.
"The whole tone of the article brings out the point.
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difficult of proper application. ' 27 Looking at the matter from
such a perspective brings a question to the forefront. Can
Leidy's test of an "independent calling" be applied to all salesmen? Does it stand for the proposition that the traditional
"control" test is to be effectively subordinated whenever we find
that an employed person is not working at an independent business which is distinct from that of his employer? The obvious
answer is in the negative. Even Leidy does not totally reject the
"control" test. He agrees that it must be used in conjunction
with the "independent calling" formula. And, as has already
been illustrated when the philosophy was applied in connection
with his assumed background, where the salesmen were all driving automobiles, it was easy, and no one can say illogical, for
Leidy to find that the salesman was so clearly not engaged in an
independent calling that control was present. The same argument cannot be extended to take all salesmen out of the
"independent calling" class. The common law as reaffirmed by
the Restatement of Agency 2s gave no hint that if one was not
engaged in a distinct occupation or business he could not be an
independent contractor. It is true that the fact that one was
engaged in such separate occupation or business strongly tended
to prove that such individual was an independent contractor.
If, however, he was not so engaged there was still the possibility
that the other eight tests (among which the "control" dogma
occupies a major position) mentioned in the Restatement of
Agency 29 would establish an independent contractor relationship.
Even Leidy admits that there are i~mumerable decisions in the
salesmen cases 30 which, in spite of the fact that the salesman
was not engaged in a distinct business or occupation, found
that he was an independent contractor. Such cases forgot
about the importance of the "instrumentality" element 3' and
placed their holding upon the "control" rule. In this respect,
as Leidy inferentially argues, they may have been wrong. But
they were not wrong in finding a salesman an independent contractor even though such individual was not operating in a district occupation or business. For in the last analysis it must be
"I upra, note 20.
1 Restatement of Agency, section 220 (1933).
29 Supra, note 28.
"Such cases are too familiar and too numerous to require citation.
31Supra, note 28.
2s
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understood that all nine tests existing at common law and
approved by the Restatement must be applied with common
sense after conscientiously surveying the whole picture. Articles,
like Leidy's, 32 which attempt to decide the matter by applying
a concrete rule usually succeed in helping in only a few factual
areas. In other areas they help little to clarify. In spite of an
imperative demand for progress and exactness in stating the
law, to date in the field of master-servant-independent contractor, no better solution to the problems that exist have been
found than is suggested by Professor Harper in the Indiana
Law Journal under the title "The Basis of the Immunity of An
Employer of An Independent Contractor.' 33 It is there forcefully and brilliantly brought out that the problems in the particular corner of jurisprudence under discussion should be
decided upon a basis of "common sense." All the tests are of
importance, but they must be weighed so as to come out with a
"common sense" answer.
Consequently, accepting such statement as logical, it is submitted that under the common law the life insurance solicitor is
an independent contractor. The Colorado and North Carolina
courts to the contrary 34 (which as has been demonstrated seem
to have attached undue significance to the independent calling
dogma in finding control), it does not seem that "common
sense" would uphold the viewpoint that the employer exercised
significant control over the detals3 5 of the work of the life insurance agent. Of course, the life insurance solicitor receives advice,
instruction and help and, as is only natural in all employments,
is restricted by the general rules upon which the life insurance
business is conducted. But departing from specious and
artificial legalistic concepts it seems sensible to conclude that
the life company does not essentially and fundamentally exercise
control over the details of the work of its agents. The fact
that the company has the right to hire and fire the agents should
' There are others. Two such leading articles are: Steffen, "The
Independent Contractorand the Good Life", 2 Chicago L. R. 501 (1935),
and Douglas, "Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk", 38 Yale
L. J. 584 (1929).
10 Indiana L. J. 494 (1935).
' Supra, note 18.
The Restatement, supra, note 28, places stress upon the concept
covered by the word "details." So do a large majority of cases.
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not be conclusive on the matter of control. Cases in great number have so decided.
Enough has been written to bring out the opinion that insurance agents do not fall within the provisions of the 'Unemployment Insurance Act because of the application of common law
rules to the factual situation. The remainder of this article will
concern itself with a discussion as to whether the Act itself has
included within its paragraphs a larger group of employees than
would be covered if we applied the common law philosophy of
the independent contractor.
An inspection of the decided cases on the point will reveal
conflict. On the one hand, the philosophy exemplified by the
Utah" court is observable. It can be summed up in a sentence
and a quotation. The only kind of independent contractor one
needs worry about under the Act is the kind defined by the
three "except" clauses. "A class of individuals, who under a
strict common law concept of independent contractorship were
other than employees are entitled (to benefits under the acts)." 37
On the other hand the Wisconsin 38 court outlines its position by
holding that the status of employee is not to be determined from
the language of the Unemployment Compensation Act. It must
be determined as such status is determined at common law or
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the status is
determined by the same consideration under Workmen's Compen39
sation as under common law.
In stating deductions it would appear that the tribunals
on both sides of the legal fence could have reasoned more lucidly.
The followers of the Utah4 o tribunal seem right in assuming
that since unless clauses (A), (B) and (C) were specifically set
forth and joined with a conjunction the clear intention of the
legislature was to place stress on the selected elements. In other
words it appears true that under some of the other six tests
" Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., 91 P. (2)

512 (Utah, 1939).
, See supra, note 13 for cases that express the same reasoning.
'Wisconsin Bridge and Iron Co. v. Ramsey, 233 Wis. 467, 290
N. W. 199 (1940). To the same effect see note "Taxable Employer's
under the Virginia Unemployment Compensation Act," 23 Va. L. R.

725 (1937).

Accord, Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176,
91 P. (2)718 (1939).
' Supra, note 36.
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summarized by the Restatement 4 ' an individual may have been
an independent contractor while he cannot be one under the
unemployment acts. Nothing appears, however, to indicate that
each one of the three "unless" clauses were not to be interpreted
as they would be in a case at common law. Consequently,
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business should not have a particularly broad meaning. It has
only its common law meaning-a meaning which has been discussed previously in this article and which was not intended
to be separated from the control concept.
The followers of the Wisconsin 42 court, among which group
is the Washington 4 3 tribunal as the most forceful and logical
spokesman, did not neglect to recognize that the three "except"
clauses should receive their common law connotation. They did,
however, neglect to present us with a fully reasoned out
rationale which would go a long way in establishing the sanity
of such an outlook.
In working out such a background it would seem fundamental to recognize that although unemployment insurance can
44
be justified on the basis that unemployment is a trade risk it
was not intended to cover that type of worker whose work day
and success depended to a major extent upon his own efforts.
It is all very well and just to provide that unemployment compensation cover the workers who are constantly under supervision and control and who find it difficult if not impossible
to fail to follow routine and come up to standards. When such
workers lose their jobs because of the pinch of economic circumstances there exists the kind of a trade risk that can be fairly
imposed upon an employer. But, when there exists that class
of individual who cannot be fundamentally controlled by the
employer, courts and administrative officials are confronted
with an entirely different factual picture. They are dealing
with an individual who can regulate his own time and efforta person who may work today and not tomorrow-who may
show effort today and relax tomorrow. Actually, it is difficult
to determine when such persons are unemployed. The severance
41
Supra, note 28.
Supra, note 38.
Supra, note 39.
"Pike, "Uncmp7oym;ent Insurance and Vorkmen's Compensation",
42
43

10 So. Calif. L. R. 253 (1937).
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of the bond of employment may not be significant. For it may
be that such person has long before and of his own free will made
himself into something other than an employee by his indifference to his business. Surely, unemployment compensation was
not intended to protect against such happenings. A clue to such
conclusion can be found in the usual provision in the Acts 45 that
workers are disqualified if they voluntarily leave work or are discharged for misconduct.
As refutation to part of what has just been outlined it may
be argued that a proved consistently hard worker who has
encountered troubled days because of a personal production
slump should receive unemployment benefits. 46 A rebuttal to
such reasoning might be found in the fact that it would be difficult, perhaps impossible to prove that such individual was still
working at top capacity or ability and that it did not seem that
the legislature would intend involving parties in such complexities. But, be that as it may, for the sake of argument it will
be granted that satisfactory proof of hard work would not be
lacking. Even when that is done the individual that confronts
us is still not the same as the cupervised worker who loses his
position because of a decrease in business. Why is that so?
The answer is not hard to give. The uncontrolled individual
(agent in our discussion) still has the inherent power to make
his own living in his present occupation. He still has the power
and opportunity to try to sell or perform his particular work.
The supervised individual, however, cannot go on with his work.
There is little he can do to continue to earn a living at his present
trade.
Viewing the problem in such light leads to the conclusion
that in the latter case society owes the worker protection while
in the former instance it does not. It is, of course, most
unfortunate that depressed conditions make it impossible for
the uncontrolled individual to earn a living. He is, nevertheless,
in no worse position than thousands of employers and
For a discussion of a typical act on the point alluded to see
Orfield, "The Nebraska Unemployment Compensation Law," 16 Neb.
L. B. 148 (1937).
4 Furthermore, it seems that the ruling of the Illinois Commissioner (Prentice-Hall, State Unemployment Insurance Service, section
27231 (1940), to the effect that an agent was not unemployed if he
received no commissions because of a slack period, would express the
intention of the legislatures.
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independent workers who cannot make ends meet. At present
society cannot do anything for such group through unemployment insurance.
There may be some who are quick to rejoin that companies
that haye a surplus can afford to pay unemployment insurance
to uncontrolled salesmen and that the Unemployment Insurance
Acts were intended to cover a class of individuals who would be
independent contractors under a common law interpretation of
the three unless clauses. But for courts to assume such an
attitude would amount to judicial legislation under a "soak the
rich" philosophy and would be unmindful of the fact that many
companies do not have large surpluses. In the area under specific
discussion the result of a "soaking" policy may end in the companies being forced to distribute- the expense to the average
policyholder and may culminate in the widow and orphan receiving protection under a smaller policy. Certainly society does not
at present want such outcome. If its intent should change it
is reasonable to expect that it will be shown in specific legislation
protecting the insurance solicitor. Although we are dealing
with a statute we cannot get away from independent contractor
concepts and all that Harper said about "common sense." It
may have been found expedient and necessary to shift the risk
in tort cases to the one best able to pay. In unemployment cases
there does not seem to be the same justification. As long as
society cannot protect all from business depressions, it appears
that the insurance solicitor has no prior claim. He is not in the
favorable position of the injured party who can reach back to
the employer even though he be remote.
Before concluding this article, one remaining point needs
clarification. Whenever state statutes4 7 have specifically
exempted insurance solicitors from the coverage of unemployment acts they have confined the exemption to those individuals
who are paid entirely or substantially by commissiou. The
administrative rulings have followed the idea embraced in the
statutes. It is suggested that in the future courts and officials
should not become too technically minded in connection with the
above matter. Of late beginning agents have received some
financial aid from the companies to tide them over the period of
inexperience. They have later had the amounts given them
1Supra, note 4.

194
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deducted from the commissions they- earn. It would be bad if
interpretation of the unemployment acts were to induce the companies to abandon a worthy effort to help new men.
If this article has served in setting forth some guiding
reasons which will help the courts and commissions in the event
of future "pressure" it has done all that was intended. The
repercussions from possible pressure will need to be controlled
by rational principles.

